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THE CASE OF THE MALE OB-GYN: A 
PROPOSAL FOR EXPANSION OF THE PRIVACY 
BFOQ IN THE HEALTHCARE CONTEXT 
Emily Gold Waldmant 
"Join an all female Obgyn practice in the Columbus suburbs," states 
one job posting on obgyn.net, a comprehensive website for obstetrician- 
gynecologists ("OB-GYNS").' "Join all female Obg group 20 minutes 
outside San Francisco," states another.' Yet a third posting comes from an 
Atlanta "privately owned all female group [that] wants to add another 
~ b ~ ~ n . " ~  A recent issue of Boston Magazine contains an advertisement 
from About Women By Women, P.C., a medical practice located in 
Wellesley, Massachusetts that describes itself as offering "[flemale 
OBIGYNs specializing in Obstetrics, Gynecology, [and] ~nfert i l i t~";~ the 
practice's website explicitly states that it has an "all-female ~taff ."~ 
As the above examples illustrate, the face of the typical OB-GYN 
practice is changing rapidly. Over the past ten years, women have gone 
from filling slightly less than half of the nation's OB-GYN residencies to 
filling more than two-thirds of them.6 All-female OB-GYN medical 
1- Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York. Law Clerk to Chief 
Judge William G. Young, United States District Court of Massachusetts (2002-03). J.D., 
magna cum laude, Harvard Law School (2002). B.A., summa cum laude, Yale University 
(1999). I thank Christine Jolls and Elizabeth Bartholet for their helpful comments on drafts 
of this article. 
1. Posting of National Physicians Placement Services (Columbus, OH) to 
http://www.obgyn.net/cfm/jobs/jobs.cfm (Apr. 17, 2002) (copy on file with author). 
2. Posting of National Physicians Placement Services (San Francisco, CA) to 
http://www.obgyn.net/cfm/jobs/jobs.cfm (Apr. 29, 1999) (copy on file with author). 
3. Posting of National Physicians Placement Services (Atlanta, GA) to 
http:Nwww.obgyn.net/cfm/jobs/jobs.cfm (Feb. 14,2001) (copy on file with author). 
4. About Women By Women, P.C., BOSTON MAG., Aug. 2003, at 176. 
5. About Women By Women, P.C., available at http://www.aboutwomenby 
women.yourmd.com. 
6. Tamar Lewin, Women's Health is No Longer a Man's World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
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practices have risen in popularity.7 Job openings frequently express 
preferences for female applicants-sometimes, as illustrated above, by 
describing the medical practice as an all-female group.8 Female OB-GYNS 
are sometimes offered higher starting salaries: and numerous physicians 
report that male medical students are being discouraged from entering the 
field.'' A recent New York Times article highlighted the case of one male 
OB-GYN, David Garfinkel, who was terminated less than two years after 
he was hired by Morristown Obstetrics after allegedly having been told that 
because he was a male, he "wasn't drawing as many patients as they had 
expected."" Dr. Garfinkel responded by suing the medical practice for 
gender discrimination.I2 
Obstetrician-gynecologists widely recognize the phenomenon, but 
vary in their responses to it. Some view the change as entirely appropriate. 
They argue that the intimate nature of the specialty prompts women to seek 
out physicians of the same sex, both because they feel more comfortable, 
2001, at A1 (stating that in 2001 women filled 70.3 percent of the nation's OB-GYN 
residencies, compared with slightly less than half ten years ago). In 1980, women 
accounted for only one-third of first-year OB-GYN residents. Susan Ladd, OBIGYN: A 
Woman's Place?, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Sept. 20,1996, at D l .  
7. See, e.g., Kate Stone Lombardi, A Clinic Where All the Doctors Are Women, N.Y. 
TIMES,  Dec. 3, 2000, at WE8 (explaining that the rising need for female doctors has led to 
the rise of all-female practices). 
8. See, e.g., Ann Carnahan, A Woman's World: Female OB/GYNs Can Name Their 
Ticket, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN EWS, Jan. 23, 2000, at 8F (stating that female OB- 
GYNs are heavily recruited over their male counterparts); Bob Condor, Women 
Obstetricians Have Male Counterparts on Run, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1996, at 1 (referring to 
a second-year resident who stated that recruitment advertisements clearly express a 
preference for female applicants). 
9. See, e.g., Carnahan, supra note 8, at 10F (noting a statement by Daniel Stem, the 
president of the National Association of Physician Recruiters, that clients of his company 
are paying more for female OB-GYNS who have just finished their residencies, with men 
receiving offers from $140,000 to $160,000, and women receiving up to $175,000 with 
signing bonuses); Sally Jacobs, No Men Need Apply: As Demand Soars for Female 
Gynecologists, Males Search For Work, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1996, at 57 (stating that 
medical practices may offer women salaries that are twenty percent higher than those 
offered to men). These disparities are generally explained on the grounds that women 
attract more customers and build their employers' practices more quickly. Id. at 60. 
10. See, e.g., Jamie Jordan, A Question of SEX: Are Male OB/GYN Specialists 
Becoming an Endangered Species?, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), June 24, 1996, at 13 
(noting that a male OB-GYN who began practicing in 1987 stated that he had been advised 
by many people against going into gynecology); Lewin, supra note 6, at A14 (quoting, 
among others, a young male OB-GYN who stated that he was "discouraged from becoming 
a gynecologist at every step of the process"). Such statements contrast interestingly with the 
experience of Dr. Vanessa Haygood, who entered the OB-GYN field in 1982, and noted that 
at that time, "it wasn't a specialty in which women were welcomed." Ladd, supra note 6, at 
D l .  
11. Lewin, supra note 6, at AI .  
12. Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 773 A.2d 665 (N.J. 
2001). 
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and because they believe that their health concerns can be more fully 
understood by a doctor who has physically undergone the same 
experiences.13 Other OB-GYNs-both female and male-are troubled by 
the phenomenon, arguing that it reflects reverse discrimination and bad 
medicine. "'It's unrealistic for women to say that their doctor has to have 
gone through labor to understand labor. . . . They'd never expect their 
cancer doctor to have had cancer'," stated one female OB-GYN.'~ 
As this trend continues, increasing numbers of male OB-GYNS may 
bring gender discrimination cases to court, just as Dr. Garfinkel has. But 
how will-and how should-these cases be resolved? In fact, courts have 
not yet ruled on the precise question of whether an OB-GYN practice can 
make explicitly gender-based decisions about which physicians to hire and 
fire. The few cases that have included gender discrimination causes of 
action brought by male OB-GYNS have been resolved on other grounds, 15 
and the New Jersey courts have not yet addressed this aspect of Dr. 
Garfinkel's case. Meanwhile, although commentators have-both in a 
cluster of articles published in the 1970s and 1980s16 and in a recent 
13. See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 6, at D l  (quoting a female OB-GYN as stating that 
"'[tlhings many patients say to me are, "I feel like you know what I'm talking about." "I 
feel like you could have been in this position." . . . They're just more comfortable from a 
physical and emotional standpoint."'). Similarly, one New York Times article included the 
following reflection from a female OB-GYN who practices in an all-female practice: 
There's a lot of very fine male gynecologists out there, but many women find it 
easier to talk to another woman when the subject is sexuality or menopause or 
pregnancy . . . And it's perfectly understandable. Find me a lot of men who'll 
go to a female urologist for their yearly prostate exam. . . . [Mlany of our 
patients tell us how glad they are to be able to see women, who know exactly 
what they're going through. 
Lewin, supra note 6, at A14. See also Nicole Peradotto, In Choosing A Doctor, More 
Women Are Putting Gender First, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 24, 1998, at ID  (quoting a female 
OB-GYN as stating that '"[s]ometimes women perceive that they're not being taken 
seriously by the medical establishment and that their complaints, such as PMS, are not 
considered well-founded by science. . . . Unless you've lived through it, you can't 
understand it. "'). 
14. Lewin, supra note 6, at Al.  
15. See infra pp. 389-91 (discussing Underkofler v. Cmty. Health Care Plan, Inc., No. 
99-7838 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19040, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2000) and Veleanu v. Beth 
Israel Med. Ctr., 98 Civ. 7455 (VM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948, at * l  (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
24, 2000)). 
16. See generally Carolyn S. Bratt, Privacy and the Sex BFOQ: An Immodest Proposal, 
48 ALB. L. REV. 923 (1984); Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party 
Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985-86); Kenneth W. Kingma, Comment, Sex Discrimination 
Justt$ed Under Title VII: Privacy Rights in Nursing Homes, 14 VAL. U. L. REV. 577 (1979- 
80); Elsa M. Shartsis, Comment, Privacy as Rationale for the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985 
DETROIT C. L. REV. 865 (1985); Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977). 
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resurgence of commentary on the subje~t '~--~enerall~ attacked the notion 
of accommodating customers' privacy-based preferences, they have given 
scant attention to the reasons for, and the implications of, the recent trend 
towards female OB-GYNS. 
The first court that does have to address the precise question of gender 
preferences in the OB-GYN context will face some complex questions 
about anti-discrimination law and its desirable reach. Under Section 703 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is an unlawful employment practice to 
treat individuals differently because of their sex.I8 But Title VII also 
justifies differential treatment where sex is a "bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise."19 The current formulation of this standard states 
that in order to qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ), 
a job qualification must relate to the "essence" or "central mission" of the 
employer's b~siness.~' Courts will thus have to determine whether female 
sex is a BFOQ for practicing as an OB-GYN. This article both explores 
this specific question and, more broadly, proposes a new framework under 
which questions like these should be considered. In so doing, it reaches a 
conclusion opposite to that advanced by the majority of commentators who 
have written on the subject, some within the past year. 
The question of whether there should be male OB-GYNS is not an 
easy one. In general, customer preferences for a particular gender do not 
alone justify a BFOQ. In the gender context, BFOQs are traditionally 
found when a particular gender is necessary for "authenticity or 
genuineness" (as in the case of an actor);21 when certain sex-related 
characteristics are physically necessary to do the job-at-hand (as in the case 
of a sperm donor or a Playboy bunny22); or when only one gender is 
physically capable of safely performing the job-at-hand (as in the case of a 
parole officer in a maximum-security male prison).23 Courts differentiate 
17. See generally Jillian B. Beman, Note, Defining the "Essence of the Business": An 
Analysis of Title Vll's Privacy BFOQ After Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
749(2000); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 112 YALE L. J. 1257 (2003); Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title Vll's 
Last Bastion of Intentional Sex Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J . GENDER & L. 77 (2003). 
18. 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-2(a) (1994). 
19. 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994). 
20. See infra p. 369. 
21. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) (discussing situations in which sex-linked elements of a job predominate); see also 
Sirota, supra note 16, at 1059-60 (discussing the interpretation of the 
authenticity/genuineness BFOQ). 
22. See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Supp at 301 (noting the female BFOQ for Playboy 
bunnies). 
23. See, e.g.,  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-37 (1977) (holding that an 
Alabama regulation under which women could not be hired as correctional counselors in 
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these cases from ones in which consumers merely prefer to be served by 
employees of a particular gender, as in the case of airline passengers who 
generally enjoy being served by female flight attendants? or even in the 
case of a company with many Latin American associates who would refuse 
to deal with a female in a management position.25 
Within the general rule that customer preferences for a particular 
gender do not justify a BFOQ, however, is a small exception generally 
known as the "privacy BFOQ." This exception holds that in certain 
instances, consumers' privacy interests can justify sex-based employment 
discrimination. The Supreme Court itself has not yet addressed the issue of 
whether customer privacy-based preferences can ever give rise to a 
BFOQ.'~ A number of lower courts, however, have found that customer 
privacy interests in prisons, restrooms, and-most importantly for the 
purposes of this article-healthcare institutions are sufficient to create a 
BFOQ." For example, several courts have held that hospitals are entitled 
to employ only female nurses in their labor and delivery unitsz8 
Even so, the case of the male OB-GYN presents a unique situation. 
As this article will discuss, in the cases where lower courts have found 
privacy BFOQs in the healthcare context, an important part of their 
reasoning typically relates to tradition-that is, the view that certain 
situations (for example, bathing an elderly woman in a nursing home) 
implicate bodily modesty interests that are so fundamental, ingrained, and 
deeply held that being of a particular gender is virtually necessary for 
effective job performance. By contrast, there is no question that male OB- 
GYNs are capable of performing their jobs; until recently, they were the 
norm. Although bodily modesty interests are certainly implicated in a 
gynecological examination, women's long history of using male OB-GYNS 
contact positions at maximum-security all-male prisons was justified under the BFOQ 
exception). 
24. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that being female is not a BFOQ for a flight attendant position); Wilson, 517 F. 
Supp. at 296,304 (holding that being female is not a BFOQ for a flight attendant). 
25. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
being male is not a BFOQ for a management position in a Latin American company even if 
many clients would refuse to deal with a female manager). 
26. See, e.g., Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) 
(stating that the Supreme Court has not addressed whether customer privacy-based 
preferences can give rise to a BFOQ). 
27. See infra Part I11 (discussing privacy BFOQs created by several lower courts). 
28. See EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12256, at *11-*13 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (holding that gender-based discrimination 
against male labor and delivery nurses was justified because of the expectant mother's 
personal privacy interest); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981) 
(upholding a BFOQ for female labor and delivery nurses), vacated on other grounds b y  671 
F.2d 1100. 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982); see also infra pp. 373-77. 
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demonstrates that these interests are not prohibitive in this context. Indeed, 
it seems clear that the choice of a female OB-GYN reflects a preference, 
not a literal necessity. 
There are thus three potential paths toward resolving this issue. First, 
courts could "hold the line" and essentially keep the status quo in place; 
that is, they could refuse to extend the privacy BFOQ to this context, 
reasoning that even if female sex has been held to be a BFOQ for labor 
nursing positions, the prevalence of males in the OB-GYN field renders it 
absurd to declare female sex a BFOQ for OB-GYNs. Second, courts could 
contract the privacy BFOQ, reasoning that female sex should be a BFOQ 
for neither labor nurses nor OB-GYNs, given that men are capable of 
providing the healthcare services at the essence of these businesses. This is 
the path advocated by many commentators, who argue that the privacy 
BFOQ is fundamentally inconsistent with anti-discrimination law.29 Third, 
courts could expand the privacy BFOQ, holding that female sex is a 
legitimate BFOQ for both labor nurses and OB-GYNs. 
This article argues that the first path is both untenable and undesirable. 
For the doctrine to develop to the point that female sex is a BFOQ for a 
labor nurse-but not for the physician delivering the baby-would be 
profoundly inconsistent with Title VII. After all, the lack of a long history 
of female OB-GYNs (in contrast to the longstanding prevalence of female 
midwives and labor nurses) is directly related to the gender biases that used 
to dominate medi~ine.~' Allowing these divergent histories to play a 
dispositive role in the analysis would therefore be deeply ironic. Moreover, 
the article argues that the general prevalence and long history of male OB- 
GYNs actually cuts both ways in the analysis. On the one hand, the 
predominance of males in the field makes the claim that female sex as a 
BFOQ for OB-GYNs seems incongruous, even somewhat silly. On the 
other hand, the fact that women are choosing female OB-GYNs in spite of 
the longstanding predominance of male OB-GYNs-and even in spite of 
their own personal history of using male OB-GYNs, often for many 
years-suggests that something other than uninformed, unthinking 
prejudice is at work here. Given that malignant biases were the 
fundamental evil against which Title VII was directed, it is strange indeed 
that indications of their absence could work in favor of finding a Title VII 
violation. 
Although this article therefore argues strongly against treating labor 
nurses and OB-GYNS differently in the BFOQ analysis, it recognizes that a 
real choice still remains between the second path (rejecting the privacy 
29. See infra pp. 38 1-83 (discussing these commentators' positions). 
30. See JUDITH WALZER LEAVI~T, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILD-BEARING IN AMERICA, 
1750-1950, 110-12 (1986) (noting that in 1900, only six percent of physicians in the United 
States were women). 
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BFOQ for both jobs) and the third path (expanding it so that it covers both 
types of jobs). This article argues in favor of the third path, and more 
generally, in favor of expanding the privacy BFOQ to protect interests 
other than bodily modesty. Although the article does not argue that 
differential pay is warranted--once a male OB-GYN is hired, for example, 
the law does and should require his employer to pay him the same salary 
and benefits as a similarly-situated female3'--it does argue that employers 
should, in certain instances, be permitted to make hiring and firing 
decisions that take employee gender into account, even when physical 
modesty interests are not at stake. In making this argument, the article 
closely analyzes the nature of the trend toward female OB-GYNS, an 
assessment that is absent from recent commentators' articles on the subject. 
This conclusion departs not only from the majority of commentators' 
positions, but also from case law precedent. As this article discusses in 
detail, courts have typically focused their inquiry only on whether a bodily 
modesty interest is implicated in the business. This article argues, 
however, that rather than making customer nudity the sine qua non for the 
establishment of a privacy BFOQ, courts should instead apply a broad, 
three-pronged test. 
The first prong of this test would examine whether the customer 
preference is for same-gender service, as opposed to a general preference 
of male and female customers for a position to be filled by employees of 
only one gender (e.g., a general preference among airline passengers for 
female flight attendants). This article contends that preferences for same- 
gender care should be less presumptively suspect, because they do not 
necessarily rest on general stereotypes about the sexes (e.g., that only men 
should be firefighters, or that only females should be nurses) and because 
they have less potential to keep one gender entirely out of a certain field of 
employment. The second prong requires that the business at issue 
implicate privacy and/or therapeutic interests that are gender-related.32 
31. Doing otherwise is prohibited by the Equal Pay Act, which provides that: 
No employer. . . shall discriminate. . . between employees on the basis of sex 
by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate 
at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment 
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, 
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex . . . . 
29 U.S.C. 8 206(d)(1) (1998). 
32. For example, the business at issue might frequently involve discussions between its 
customers and employees about intimate sexual concerns, or might require its employees to 
serve as role models for an all-female or all-male clientele. Whether or not a specific 
position implicates gender-related privacy or therapeutic interests would require a context- 
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This criterion thus expands the existing privacy BFOQ standard because it 
can be met by interests other than bodily modesty. Finally, as a backstop, 
the third prong requires that the preference for same-gender service not 
derive from malignant gender stereotypes (e.g., that women are less 
intelligent than men, or do not belong in positions of authority). 
This article argues that when these three criteria have been satisfied, 
courts should be willing to recognize a BFOQ on the basis of customer 
preference. This revised BFOQ might continue to be referred to as the 
"privacy BFOQ" (with an understanding that it has been broadened to 
encompass "psychological privacy" interests). Alternatively, it could be 
referred to as a "privacy BFOQ when privacy interests are primarily 
driving the preference for same-gender care, and as a "therapeutic B F O Q  
when the interests at issue are more therapeutic in nature.33 
Under this revised BFOQ test, female sex would be recognized as a 
BFOQ for OB-GYNs, and medical practices would not be liable for 
favoring female OB-GYNS in employment decisions. This reformulation 
of the BFOQ defense would also have implications beyond the specific 
question of the male OB-GYN. By explicitly moving beyond the current 
formulation of the privacy BFOQ defense, it would allow far more gender- 
based employment decisions than are currently permissible in the law. 
Most obviously, it would have dramatic implications in the healthcare 
context, not only in medical practices, but also in settings such as mental 
health facilities and gyms, since these businesses also frequently implicate 
gender-related privacy and/or therapeutic interests, which in turn often 
prompt customer preferences for same-gender care. Depending on the 
specific context, such preferences can often stem from the heightened 
ability for the caregiver to serve as a role model, the greater comfort in 
discussing intimate concerns with the caregiver, and/or the caregiver's 
shared physicality and firsthand experience with the same gender-related 
concerns that his or her customers or patients have. This revised BFOQ 
would permit employers to respond to these preferences even when no 
nudity on the part of the customer is involved. 
Such an expansion of the privacy BFOQ would be consistent with the 
purposes of Title VII and the BFOQ exception. This article argues that 
within the context of gender discrimination, Title VII should be interpreted 
fundamentally as preventing gender-based employment decisions that are 
specific inquiry. 
33. Of course, as illustrated infra, the distinction between privacy and therapeutic 
interests are not always obvious; a woman's discomfort in discussing intimate sexual 
concerns with a male physician could be seen as embodying both types of interests. Other 
times, the distinction is clearer; nurse and nurse's aide positions typically implicate only 
privacy interests, whereas counselor positions with significant role-modeling functions fall 
more into the "therapeutic" category. 
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based on and/or perpetuate malignant and detrimental characterizations of 
the sexes. The very fact that a BFOQ exception exists in the gender 
discrimination context-as opposed to the racial discrimination context, in 
which there is no such exception-underscores this point. Thus, when the 
job at issue truly implicates privacy or therapeutic concerns that are gender- 
related, and the evidence indicates that customer preferences derive from 
these concerns rather than malignant gender biases, it is consistent with 
Title VII and the "essence of the business standard"34 to recognize gender 
as a BFOQ. 
As mentioned above, and as discussed at greater length in this article, 
there are a number of ways that same-gender care in certain professions- 
particularly the healthcare professions--can directly lead to increased 
effectiveness in the services provided. Moreover, it is particularly 
appropriate that this article's proposed reformulation would expand the 
BFOQ defense in the healthcare world, given that (as is shortly discussed in 
greater detail) Title VII's legislative history reveals that Congress 
recognized the heightened importance of the BFOQ defense in the 
healthcare setting. This article is thus limited to delineating and analyzing 
how the reformulated BFOQ would play out in the healthcare context, 
particularly using the case study of the male OB-GYN. The proposal, 
however, is general in nature and is certainly applicable to other 
employment settings that implicate gender-related privacy or therapeutic 
concerns. 
The article proceeds in three main parts. First, it discusses the general 
case law surrounding customer preferences for a particular gender, looking 
at the enactment and development of the BFOQ defense, particularly in the 
context of customer preferences. It argues that the courts' general rejection 
of the customer preference rationale for BFOQs was entirely appropriate, 
given that these preferences typically reflected malignant gender biases- 
most often, chauvinistic attitudes that result in female subordination. 
Second, the article examines the rise of the privacy BFOQ. It argues 
that the courts were correct in recognizing the privacy BFOQ, given the 
qualitatively different nature of the customer preferences at issue in these 
cases. It acknowledges that the critical commentary regarding the privacy 
BFOQ is largely negative, but suggests that these commentators tend to 
incorrectly assume that customer preferences for same-gender healthcare 
necessarily derive from unconscious prejudices about "appropriate" gender 
roles and women's sexual vulnerability. In making this argument, the 
article highlights the reasons that actual patients of female OB-GYNS have 
given for preferring same-gender gynecological care. Moreover, the article 
argues that courts have not gone far enough in recognizing BFOQs in the 
34. See infra pp. 369-72 (describing the essence of the business standard). 
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healthcare context. In so doing, it identifies cases in which courts 
explicitly refused to find a gender BFOQ despite the considerable gender- 
related therapeutic interests implicated by the employment position in 
question, simply because of their belief that only bodily privacy interests 
could justify a BFOQ. The article suggests that the privacy BFOQ should 
be broadened, based on the three criteria described above, to cover a wider 
range of cases. 
The article's final section turns to the specific issues surrounding the 
male OB-GYN. It analyzes how a discrimination lawsuit brought by a 
male OB-GYN would likely be addressed under the current doctrine, and 
then evaluates how the case would be considered under the reformulated 
BFOQ. 
11. OVERVIEW: CUSTOMER PREFERENCES AND THE GENDER BFOQ 
The BFOQ defense to gender-based discrimination was added to the 
Civil Rights ~ c t ~ ~  on February 10, 1964, in the House's final stages of 
deliberation over the A C ~ . ~ ~  Representative Goodell of New York, noting 
that the Act already included a BFOQ defense for religious and national 
origin discrimination, suggested amending it to include sex as well. 
Interestingly enough, Representative Goodell appealed specifically to the 
healthcare world, stating: 
There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona 
fide occupational qualification. For instance, I think of an elderly 
woman who wants a female nurse. There are many things of this 
nature which are bona fide occupational qualifications, and it 
seems to me they would be properly considered here as an 
exception.37 
The amendment was soon added, with the drafter of the original BFOQ 
defense indicating that his initial omission of sex had simply been an 
oversight. No opposition to the BFOQ defense is apparent from the 
Congressional Record; support for the change appears to have been 
unanimous.38 Indeed, after the alteration was made, one legislator- 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994). 
36. See generally Sirota, supra note 16, at 1027-33 (describing the legislative history 
behind the inclusion of Title VII sex discrimination and BFOQ provisions into the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). Title VII was extended to prohibit sex discrimination on February 8, 
1964. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[Tlhis amendment is 
offered to the fair employment practices title of this bill to include within our desire to 
prevent discrimination against another minority group, the women . . . ."). The BFOQ was 
expanded to cover sex on February 10, 1964. Id. at 2718. 
37. Id. at 27 18 (statement of Rep. Goodell). 
38. Id. at 2718 (indicating that there was a "unanimous-consent request that those 
words be added"). 
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Representative Green of Oregon-reiterated the importance of the BFOQ 
defense to gender-based discrimination in the healthcare world. She posed 
the following hypothetical: 
In a large hospital an elderly woman needs special round-the- 
clock nursing. Her family is seeking to find a fully qualified 
registered nurse. It does not make any difference to this family if 
the nurse is a white or a Negro or a Chinese or a Japanese if she 
is fully qualified. But it does make a great deal of difference to 
this elderly woman and her family as to whether this qualified 
nurse is a man or a woman. Under the terms of the amendment 
adopted last Saturday [whereby Title VII was expanded to 
prohibit gender discrimination] the hospital could not advertise 
for a woman registered nurse because under the amendment by 
the gentleman from Virginia [Rep. Smith] this would be 
discrimination based on sex. The suggestion of the gentleman of 
New York [Rep. Goodell] helped a great deal, however.39 
The only other elaboration of the BFOQ defense in Title VII's 
legislative history can be found in two related documents that were 
submitted to Congress on April 8, 1964. The first, an Interpretive 
Memorandum on Title VII submitted by Senators Clark and Case on April 
8, 1964, stated: 
[I]t would not be an unlawful employment practice to hire or 
employ employees of a particular religion, sex, or national origin 
in those situations where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona 
fide occupational qualification for the job. This exception must 
not be confused with the right which all employers would have to 
hire and fue on the basis of general qualifications for the job, 
such as skill or intelligence. This exception is a limited right to 
discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where 
the reason for the discrimination is a bona fide occupational 
qualification. Examples of such legitimate discrimination would 
be the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook, the 
preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and 
the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of 
members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that 
religion.40 
The second was a memorandum prepared by Senator Clark in response to 
various questions that had previously been posed by Senator   irks en.^' 
This dialogue reads as follows: 
39. Id. at 2720 (statement of Rep. Green). 
40. Id. at 72 13. 
41. Id. at 7217 (statement of Sen. Clark). 
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Question. Now I turn to discrimination on account of sex. 
Frankly, I always like to discriminate in favor of the fairer sex. I 
hope that the might of the Federal Government will not enjoin me 
from such discrimination. But let us look further at this 
provision. Historically, discrimination because of sex has been a 
protective discrimination because we do not believe that women 
should do heavy manual labor of the sort which falls to the lot of 
some men. This is not true, of course, in some other countries 
where we see pictures of women working on the roads and in the 
mines. Then, too, we discriminate in favor of women because of 
nimble abilities in many fields, such as the assembly of radios 
and delicate instruments and machines. Where the discrimination 
is not in the best interest of the fairer sex we have approached the 
problem by specific prohibitions such as the requirement of equal 
pay for women doing the same work as men. 
Answer. Wherever sex is a bona fide qualification or 
disqualification for a particular job, [Tlitle VII does not require 
that equal job opportunity be given to both sexes.42 
Thus, the legislative history of the BFOQ (scant though it is)-along 
with the relatively permissive statutory language that gender-based 
discrimination is permissible when "sex . . . is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise"3-suggests that Congress intended the 
BFOQ defense to have a fairly broad effect. As Michael Sirota notes, 
however, since the Civil Rights Act's passage, "[bloth the courts and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] have interpreted the 
BFOQ provision narrowly.. . and have allowed BFOQs only in very 
limited  circumstance^.'^ 
Indeed, the general rule regarding gender-based BFOQs is that 
customer preferences are insufficient to create a BFOQ. This rule derives 
from the conjunction of two seminal Fifth Circuit cases: the 1969 case of 
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph ~ 0 . ~ ~  and the 1971 case of 
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, ~ n c . ~ ~  The Weeks court, evaluating a 
BFOQ question in a context not involving customer preferences, framed 
the issue as whether the employer could demonstrate "a factual basis for 
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform 
safely and efficiently the duties of the job in~olved."~' Two years later, the 
42. Id. (emphasis added). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994) (emphasis added). 
44. See Sirota, supra note 16, at 1026. 
45. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). 
46. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
47. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235. 
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Diaz court, evaluating a BFOQ question in the customer preference 
context, elaborated on this standard. It stated that customer preferences for 
a particular gender could justify a BFOQ "only when the essence of the 
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex 
exclusively."48 
Together, the Weeks and Diaz tests can be seen as creating a two- 
pronged-and very ~ t r i n ~ e n t - i n ~ u i r ~ . ~ ~  One prong involves the 
assessment of whether the job duties under consideration require that the 
worker be of one sex only (that is, whether only one sex can perform those 
duties safely and efficiently). The other prong-which has generally 
become the dominant prong in assessing BFOQ claims-examines whether 
those duties are reasonably necessary to convey the essence of the 
employer's business. 
Applying this rigorous standard, courts have repeatedly rejected the 
argument that customer preferences can justify a gender-based BFOQ. For 
the most part, such cases have arisen in contexts where customer 
preferences for or against women have reflected-either subtly or 
overtly-chauvinistic attitudes toward females as subservient, inferior, 
and/or worthy of objectification. The Diaz case itself provides a good 
example of the attitude towards women that often drove these preferences. 
There, the defendant employer, Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan 
Am), argued that female sex was a BFOQ for flight attendants because 
passengers "overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female 
stewardes~es."~~ Pan Am highlighted female flight attendants' allegedly 
superior abilities in the non-mechanical aspects of the job, such as 
"providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous 
personalized service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as 
,951 possible . . . . The Diaz court appropriately rejected the argument that 
customers' preferences that they be served by women justified a BFOQ, 
explaining that the "primary function of an airline is to transport passengers 
safely from one point to another" and that female flight attendants' superior 
abilities to enhance the flight environment were only tangential to that 
f~nction.~ '  
In other cases, stereotypic attitudes regarding women's "proper place" 
have even more blatantly shaped preferences for employees of a particular 
48. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388. 
49. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234-36 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(describing in greater detail the relevant inquiry under the Weeks and Diaz tests); Wilson v. 
Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (describing the Weeks and 
Diaz decisions as having "given rise to a two step BFOQ test."). 
50. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387 (summarizing evidence submitted by Pan Am in regard to its 
experience with hiring male and female cabin attendants). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 388. 
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53 gender. In Femandez v. Wynn Oil Co., for example, Wynn Oil Company 
(Wynn) argued that being male was a BFOQ for a particular management 
position that required significant contact with its Latin American 
distributors and clients.54 Wynn argued that a female would not be able to 
attract and do business with the company's Latin American associates 
because many of them "would be offended by a woman conducting 
business meetings in her hotel room."55 Wynn's regional manager stated 
explicitly that a woman in a high-level management position would not be 
accepted by these associates because "of the prevalent mores relating to the 
proper roles of men and women in those countrie~."~~ The district court, 
applying Diaz, concluded that male gender was indeed a BFOQ for the 
position, stating that "[als quaint as that notion appears to the American 
mind, it is a very real and formidable obstacle to the success of any 
business enterprise in South Ameri~a."~' The Ninth Circuit, however, 
disagreed, stating that "stereotypic impressions of male and female roles do 
not qualify gender as a BFOQ" and that foreign customs should not be 
permitted to limit the enforcement of Title VII in the United 
Although the Ninth Circuit did a f f m  the district court's ruling on other 
grounds?9 it left no doubt that in its view, the facts presented by Wynn did 
not give rise to a BFOQ. 
Diaz and Fernandez both illustrate how traditional conceptions about 
the genders' "proper roles" can lead to preferences for employees of a 
particular gender. The case of Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 60 
meanwhile, illustrates how objectifying attitudes toward women can also 
result in such preferences. Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest), whose 
clientele primarily included male businessmen, adopted a marketing 
strategy whereby it actively promoted its ability to provide "tender loving 
care" to its passengers.61 It dressed its flight attendants in "high boots and 
hot-pants," featured them in advertisements designed to showcase their 
attractiveness, and encouraged them to "maintain an atmosphere of 
53. No. CV-78-0160, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10704 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1979), a r d ,  
653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). 
54. Fernandez, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *3-*5. Wynn did not acknowledge that it 
had discriminated on the basis of gender in the plaintiffs case; it merely argued that if it had 
done so, the BFOQ defense would have protected it. Id at *3. 
55. Id. at *4. 
56. Id. at *5. 
57. Id. at *lo-*ll .  
58. Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981). 
59. The court agreed with Wynn's contention, and the finding of the district court, that 
Wynn's decision not to promote the plaintiff had been based not on her gender, but rather on 
her lack of qualifications. Id. at 1275-76. 
60. 517F. Supp. 292(N.D.Tex. 1981). 
6 1. Id. at 294. 
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informality and 'fun' during flights."62 When faced with a claim of gender 
discrimination brought by rejected male applicants, Southwest argued that 
having exclusively female flight attendants was essential to its business 
because of its identity as the "love airline."63 The district court, however, 
concluded that even if Southwest's "love image" had indeed enhanced its 
ability to attract passengers, being female still did not constitute a BFOQ 
for these positions.64 The court emphasized that despite Southwest's 
marketing strategy, its primary business function was still the 
transportation of passengers,65 and that "sex does not become a BFOQ 
merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality as a 
marketing tool, or to better insure profitability."66 
The courts have thus appropriately made clear, through their rigorous 
application of the "essence of the business" test, that customer preferences 
deriving from chauvinistic or biased attitudes will not justify gender 
BFOQs. Although the Supreme Court has not itself addressed a case in 
which a BFOQ was alleged to exist based on customer preferences, its 
statements on the general subject of BFOQs have indicated its approval of 
the "essence of the business" test, and its belief that BFOQs should be 
construed narrowly. In Dothard v. d awl ins on,^^ for example, the Court 
stated that "the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow 
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex," 
and that Title VII was intended to prohibit the refusal "to hire an individual 
woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes."68 
In the Court's most recent ruling on the BFOQ standard, Automobile 
69 Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the majority framed its opinion around 
the "essence of the business" standard, holding invalid employer Johnson 
Controls' practice of excluding women who were capable of childbearing 
from battery-making jobs that exposed them to lead.70 The Court 
emphasized that in order to qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification must 
relate to the "'essence"' or to the "central mission of the employer's 
business."" Since the women's fertility did not "actually interfere[] with 
[their] ability to perform the joy7' of battery-making, the Court concluded 
that being a male (or a woman whose inability to bear children was 
62. Id. at 295. 
63. Id. at 294-95. 
64. Id. at 302-03. 
65. Id. at 302. 
66. Id. at 303. 
67. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
68. Id. at 333-34. 
69. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
70. Id. at 2 1 1 .  
71. Id. at 203 (quoting Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,413 (1985)). 
72. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204. 
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medically documented) did not constitute a B F O Q . ~ ~  
Thus, there is clearly a widely-enforced presumption against allowing 
customer preferences to give rise to a BFOQ, as enforced by a stringent 
"essence of the business" standard whereby courts narrowly define the 
fundamental nature of the employer's business. This presumption, 
however, is not absolute, as evidenced by the development of the privacy 
BFOQ, to which this article now turns. 
111. THE PFUVACY BFOQ: AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST 
CUSTOMER PREFERENCES 
Within the general framework described above, courts have carved out 
a small exception to deal with cases in which customer preferences for 
employees of a particular gender affects their privacy interests. These 
cases generally arise in three main contexts: prisons (where the 
"customers" are prisoners);74 janitorial settings;75 and healthcare facilities 
such as hospitals, medical practices, mental health centers, and gyms. This 
article, as noted above, focuses on the privacy BFOQ in the healthcare 
world. 
In contrast to the general presumption against allowing customer 
preferences to create a BFOQ, courts have been quite willing to recognize a 
BFOQ when a customer's privacy interests are implicated. They typically 
use a two-part test. First, they evaluate whether using employees of a 
particular gender implicates the "essence of the business," looking at 
whether bodily modesty interests are at stake. Second, they analyze 
whether the employer can selectively assign job responsibilities to 
minimize the privacy clashes that would otherwise ensue. 
The first court to confront this issue in the healthcare context was the 
District Court of Delaware, in the case of Fesel v. Masonic Home of 
Delaware, ~ n c . ~ ~  In Fesel, the court considered a case in which a male 
nurse was suing the Masonic Home, a small nursing home with a 
population of twenty-two women and eight men.77 The Masonic Home 
73. Id. at 206. 
74. See, e.g., Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the dismissal 
of male corrections officers' complaint regarding gender-based staffing assignments at a 
female prison); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversing the dismissal 
of male inmate's complaint regarding strip searches conducted by female guards). 
75. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992) 
(holding that the defendant university had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether female sex was a BFOQ for custodial work in a women's dormitory); Norwood v. 
Dale Maint. Sys., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. 111. 1984) (holding that male sex was a BFOQ for 
a janitorial position in a male restroom during daylight hours). 
76. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978). 
77. Id. at 1348. 
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(Home) had told the plaintiff that it would not hire a male nurse's aide 
because of its belief-supported by documentary evidence from a number 
of the Home's female patients and their families-that its female patients 
would object to having a male nurse's aide assist them with activities 
involving intimate personal care.78 In its motion for summary judgment, 
the Home argued that being female was a BFOQ for the position.79 The 
district court, finding that further factual development was necessary, 
denied the Home's motion.80 
At trial, the court directed a verdict for the ~ o m e . ~ '  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Fesel court first applied the "essence of the business" test, 
noting that to prevail, the Home had to demonstrate a factual basis for its 
belief that hiring males "would undermine the essence of its business 
operation."82 The court ruled that the Home had satisfied this prong, 
stressing the considerable bodily modesty interests at stake: 
The Home has the responsibility of providing twenty-four hour 
supervision and care of its elderly guests. Fulfillment of that 
responsibility necessitates intimate personal care including 
dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and 
catheter care. Each of these functions involves a personal 
touching as to which each guest is privileged by law to 
discriminate on any basis. Because our tort and criminal laws 
recognize these personal privacy interests, the Home cannot 
legally force its female guests to accept personal care from males. 
Since it is clear that a substantial portion of the female guests will 
not consent to such care, it follows that the sex of the nurse's 
aides at the Home is crucial to successful job performance.83 
The court then recognized an additional prong specific to the establishment 
of a privacy BFOQ: the employer must show that "due to the nature of the 
operation of the business, it would not be feasible to assign job 
responsibilities in a selective manner so as to avoid a collision with the 
privacy rights of the  customer^."^^ Here, too, the Fesel court concluded 
that the Home had met its burden.85 
The Fesel court's approach has been followed by other courts that 
have addressed similar situations. In Backus v. Baptist Medical 
78. Id. at 1352. 
79. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573, 574 (D. Del. 1977). 
80. Id. at 574. 
81. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1354. 
82. Id. at 1350. 
83. Id. at 1352-53. 
84. Id. at 135 1. 
85. Id. at 1353. 
86. 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated on other grounds by 671 F.2d 1100 
(8th Cir. 1982). 
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for example, a male nurse sued after his employer, a hospital, refused his 
request for a full-time position in the labor and delivery unit.87 The 
hospital, highlighting the intimate nature of the position (which included 
"checking the cervix for dilation, shaving the perineum, giving an enema, 
assisting in the expulsion of the enema and sterilizing the vaginal area"):' 
argued that female sex was a BFOQ.'~ The Backus court, applying the two- 
part test used in Fesel, agreed.90 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, the court was quick to 
conclude that female gender was a BFOQ for a staff nurse position in the 
labor and delivery area.91 The court stressed that the staff nurses' duties 
required "not only substantial contact with the mother's genitalia but also 
substantial invasion of the mother's body,"92 and that a substantial number 
of patients had expressed discomfort with the use of male nursesg3 The 
court also accepted the hospital's contention that it was not feasible to 
assign job duties in a way that would alleviate these  concern^.'^ 
It is critical to note that not all healthcare cases involve situations 
where females are the preferred sex. In Jones v. Hinds General ~ o s ~ i t a l ?  
a female nursing assistant sued her employer after she was laid off even 
though male orderlies with less seniority were retained.96 Here, the hospital 
did not argue that being male was a BFOQ for the particular nursing 
assistant position in question; rather, it argued that having a certain number 
of male employees (as nursing assistants and orderlies) was necessary to 
protect the privacy interests of its male patients.97 The hospital explained 
that various functions performed by nursing assistants or orderlies (such as 
catheterization) entailed "the manipulation or exposure of patients' 
genitalia or other private areas of their bodies," such that same-gender care 
was often needed." It argued that because prior to the layoffs the hospital 
employed more females than males, it was justified in terminating only 
women.'' The court agreed, placing weight on the testimony of one of the 
hospital's doctors that some of the older male patients were "terribly 
modest and [became] quite upset at the prospect of female nursing 
87. Id. at 1192. 
88. Id. at 1193. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11256, at *I3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 
1982). 
92. Id. at *5. 
93. Id. at *7. 
94. Id. at * 13. 
95. 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
96. Id. at 934. 
97. Id. at 935. 
98. Id. at 935. 
99. Id. at 935. 
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assistants viewing or touching their private areas,"100 and finding that "there 
were no reasonable scheduling alternatives available that could have been 
used by the Hospital to preserve privacy interests of male patients."10' 
The Supreme Court, without expressly addressing the legitimacy of 
the privacy BFOQ, has implied that it might well be valid in certain 
circumstances, notwithstanding the stringent "essence of the business" 
standard. When Justice White suggested in Automobile Workers v. 
Johnson ~ o n t r o l s l ~ ~  that the Court's strict application of the "essence of the 
business" test would render the privacy BFOQ invalid,Io3 the majority 
explicitly disagreed, writing: 
Justice White predicts that our reaffirmation of the narrowness of 
the BFOQ defense will preclude considerations of privacy as a 
basis for sex-based discrimination. We have never addressed 
privacy-based sex discrimination and shall not do so here because 
the sex-based discrimination at issue today does not involve the 
privacy interests of Johnson Controls' customers. Nothing in our 
discussion of the "essence of the business test," however, 
suggests that sex could not constitute a BFOQ when privacy 
interests are implicated.104 
Thus, both explicitly and implicitly, courts have expressed support for 
the argument that customer preferences stemming from privacy interests 
are qualitatively different from typical customer preferences for service 
from a particular gender. The Backus court, for example, referred to the 
"distinction between a privacy right and a mere customer preference."105 
Why have courts been so much more deferential in these cases? The 
courts' explicit language has focused largely on the traditional bodily 
modesty interests implicated in these businesses. Beneath the surface, 
however, three distinctive features of these cases render them qualitatively 
different from the typical customer preference cases. 
First, the privacy cases relate to preferences for same-gender service, 
rather than a general sentiment that only men or only women belong in a 
certain position. This contrasts markedly with cases like ~ i a z " ~  and 
~ o u t h w e s t , ' ~ ~  in which the defendant airlines tried to argue that both male 
100. Id. at 936. 
101. Id. at 937. 
102. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
103. Id. at 220 n.8 (White, J., concurring) ("The Court's interpretation of the BFOQ 
standard also would seem to preclude considerations of privacy as a basis for sex-based 
discrimination, since those considerations do not relate directly to an employee's physical 
ability to perform the duties of the job."). 
104. Id. at 206 n.4. 
105. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1981). 
106. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 422 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
107. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
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and female passengers were simply more comfortable being served by 
women, or that a predominantly male passenger group enjoyed receiving 
"tender loving care" from female flight attendants. Such arguments have 
two problems: first, they are often correlated with traditional, stereotyped 
views about appropriate "gender roles"; and second, they have the potential 
to keep one gender entirely out of a field of employment. Had the 
defendants in Diaz or Southwest prevailed, males might have been unable 
to obtain jobs as flight attendants. On the contrary, the holdings in the 
privacy BFOQ cases described above did not have the potential to keep 
males or females entirely out of the field of nursing, as illustrated by the 
juxtaposition of Backus (female patients' preferences for female intimate 
care) and ~inds'O' (male patients' preferences for male intimate care). 
Second, in the privacy cases described above, the courts agreed that 
the essence of the businesses at issue implicated gender-related privacy 
interests. They explicitly emphasized the bodily privacy interests at stake 
in the relevant nursing positions. The Backus court, for example, stressed 
that the obstetric ward of the hospital was a "unique section," because "[aln 
obstetrical patient constantly has her genitalia exposed."10g Similarly, the 
Mercy court emphasized that a labor patient would experience "medically 
undesired tension" were a male nurse to perform upon her the "sensitive 
and intimate duties" inherent in the job.'I0 There appears to have been little 
doubt in the courts' minds that these intimate duties went to the essence of 
the nursing positions at issue. 
Third, the courts largely indicated that in their view, malignant or 
chauvinistic stereotypes were not driving customer preferences for same- 
gender care. This attitude was not universal; the Fesel court stated that it 
viewed the elderly women's desire for female nurses as "undoubtedly 
attributable to their upbringing and to sexual stereotyping of the past."111 
The other courts, however, suggested that they viewed the preferences for 
same-gender care as a natural result of the human inclination toward 
modesty, rather than as a result of sexual stereotyping. The Backus court, 
for instance, approvingly quoted an employment law treatise's statment 
that "[gliving respect to deep-seated feeling of personal privacy involving 
one's own genital area is quite a different matter from catering to the desire 
of some male airline passenger to have . . . an attractive stewardess."Il2 
The Hinds opinion also stressed the modesty concerns at issue, with no 
108. Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
109. Backus, 5 10 F.  Supp. at 1 193. 
110. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256 at 
* 12 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982). 
1 1  1 .  Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978). 
112. Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1194 (quoting 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCR~MINATION 
$ 43.02[3][b] (2d ed. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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suggestion that it viewed gender bias as playing a role in customer 
preferences.113 Interestingly, the Mercy court specifically pointed out that 
the labor patients had made no complaints "regarding the race or national 
origin of the staff nurses or student  nurse^,""^ but had only expressed 
concern about their gender. The court likely chose to include this point- 
which is otherwise of dubious relevance to the actual issue at hand- 
because it wanted to emphasize that the patients were not bigots, but 
merely concerned about gender privacy in a particularly intimate realm. 
These three factors render the privacy cases qualitatively different 
from the typical customer preference cases, such that courts have 
appropriately treated them differently. Most commentators, however, have 
argued strongly against the privacy BFOQ, contending that it reflects 
malignant gender biases. They suggest that the privacy BFOQ contradicts 
the purpose of Title VII because it ratifies and "freezes" traditional 
attitudes toward appropriate gender roles. 
Interestingly, many of these articles were authored during the 1970s 
and 1980s, when the privacy BFOQ was first developing, partially in 
response to female patients' preferences for female labor nurses. For 
example, Michael Sirota wrote in 1977 that: 
If Title VII were construed to permit cautious employers to 
invoke the privacy claim on behalf of their customers, traditional 
employment roles would remain frozen. . . . While the presence 
of members of the opposite sex may initially shock or surprise 
customers, repeated exposure eventually may result in customer 
acceptance of the new work roles.115 
Eight years later, in response to decisions like Fesel and Backus, 
Deborah Calloway wrote that "by embracing third party privacy interests, 
the lower courts have unduly broadened the bfoq defense.. . . By 
expanding the defense to encompass privacy interests, courts permit 
employers to discriminate on the basis of customer preferences and 
community standards regarding appropriate male and female jobs."116 Like 
Sirota, Calloway was particularly concerned about the potential for the 
privacy BFOQ to "freeze" community mores. She wrote: 
By enacting Title VII Congress intended to remove artificial 
barriers that "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior 
discriminatory employment practices." If the bfoq defense 
permits employers to hire employees on the basis of the 
community's assumptions, stereotypes and preferences, the 
exception swallows the rule because even widely shared social 
113. Hinds, 666 F.  Supp. at 936. 
114. Mercy, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256, at *7. 
1 15. Sirota, supra note 16, at 1065. 
1 16. Calloway. supra note 16. at 350-5 1. 
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norms frequently are motivated by discriminatory animus or the 
products of past discrimination."' 
Ironically enough, in support of this anti-freezing argument, virtually 
all of these commentators explicitly pointed to the prevalence of male OB- 
GYNs. They argued that the predominantly male nature of the OB-GYN 
profession proved that women's bodily privacy interests were not 
prohibitive; thus, any asserted privacy interests in the desire for female 
labor nurses were largely a cover for conscious or unconscious 
discriminatory views about appropriate gender roles. Calloway, for 
instance, noted that "[flemale patients accept treatment by male doctors 
and, when asked, even express a preference for male doctors. . . . [Slocial 
norms often reflect stereotyped notions of appropriate male and female 
roles and privacy interests are asserted when women or men try to break 
into occupations traditionally held by the opposite sex.""8 
Carolyn Bratt, writing in 1984, stated: 
[Flemale patients may suffer embarrassment from bodily care 
provided by male nurses despite their acceptance of treatment by 
male gynecologists and obstetricians. 
In effect, these patients have an expectation that nurses will be 
female and doctors will be male. Surprise and sometimes shock 
may occur when a patient discovers females and males 
performing non-traditional medical roles.'19 
Similarly, Kenneth Kingma wrote in 1980 of Fesel: "Respect existed 
for the male gynecologist but not for a male nurse's aide. . . . [The court's 
ruling] perpetuated the prejudiced view toward male aides, and failed to 
carry out the forward-looking purposes of Title VII, namely, to prohibit 
unfair and stereotyped employment practices."120 
Likewise, Elsa Shartsis, writing in 1985, commented: 
[Mlost obstetrician-gynecologists are men, apparently to the 
satisfaction of their patients. That men have enjoyed a 
paternalistic, managerial status, as compared to that of women, is 
an accepted fact in our society. . . . So while a woman's sense of 
bodily privacy may dictate that she refuse gynecological care by 
a male physician, the man's traditional professional status 
overcomes the patient's reticence. The male nurse, however, 
may not share this professional edge.''' 
117. Id. at 359 (internal citations omitted). 
11 8. Id. at 361 (internal citations omitted). 
119. Bratt, supra note 16, at 946. 
120. Kingma, supra note 16, at 590. 
121. Shartsis, supra note 16, at 894-95. 
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She thus concluded that women's discomfort with male nurses was merely 
due to a "cultural lag."'22 
Two decades later, there is an obvious irony to these arguments. Now 
that women actually have the option of selecting female OB-GYNs, they 
are doing so in droves. This phenomenon casts doubt on the frequent 
argument that customer preferences for same-gender care necessarily 
derive from traditional stereotypes about gender roles. Indeed, quotations 
by numerous female patients and OB-GYNS collected from newspaper 
articles documenting the trend toward female OB-GYNs suggest that 
qualitatively different interests are driving these preferences. 
One theme that echoes among many female patients is their desire to 
have a doctor who has undergone similar physical experiences, from 
gynecological examinations to physical changes such as menopause. 
Sandy Hudgins-Brewer, a female nurse practitioner who does 
gynecological exams, stated that young females coming in for their first 
Pap smear often prefer to see her, because she can relate to their 
concerns.'23 "I remember my first Pap real well and I was scared out of my 
mind," she said.'" She also reported that many menopausal women tell her 
that it is difficult to discuss their symptoms with male doctors who have 
never experienced menopause.'25 Dr. Judith Ortman-Nabi said that when 
she was in practice with male physicians, female patients would seek her 
out, stating, "'I want to speak with the female doctor. I'm so-and-so's 
patient, but since you're a woman you could [sic] talk about 
menopause. Amy Gallagher, a patient who has used female OB-GYNS 
and nurse-midwives, stated that it was important to her to have a female 
healthcare provider during her pregnancy.'27 "There is so much going on 
spiritually, emotionally and physically that you need someone who has 
been through those experiences before," she explained.'28 Dr. Lauren 
Streicher, an OB-GYN practicing in an all-female practice, reported that 
patients are particularly attracted to the idea of having obstetricians who 
have themselves given birth,12' a sentiment echoed by patient Peggy 
Hamilton. Hamilton explained that her choice to see a female OB-GYN 
was "'about going to someone who had had two children and knew what 
labor was all about. ,99130 
A related theme was that female patients feel more comfortable 
122. Id. at 895. 
123. Jordan, supra note 10, at 13. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Peradotto, supra note 13, at ID. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Condor, supra note 8, at 8. 
130. Ladd, supra note 6, at D l .  
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discussing intimate topics with female OB-GYNs. Dr. Sheri Baczkowki 
stated that "[wle see a lot of teen-agers [sic] who have menstrual problems 
that they don't want to talk about with a man, or teens who are concerned 
about their body image."13' Dr. Diana Collins explained that some patients 
"want to discuss very personal things, to do with their sex lives, their 
libido, things they say 'I couldn't tell a man. 3,9132 Kristi Amfahr, a patient, 
stated that she "[couldn't] imagine talking to a male doctor about sex or 
'anything intimate. r,,133 She reflected, "[slay there was some really 
embarrassing issue I had to talk about, like something hormonal . . . I 
would feel more secure talking to a woman."'34 In fact, Dr. Linn Parsons, 
an OB-GYN professor at Bowman Gray School of Medicine, stated that a 
six-month study of male and female residents indicated that female patients 
are particularly drawn to female OB-GYNs when their medical needs 
implicate therapeutic concerns. She reported that women patients seemed 
to choose "women doctors based on what their complaint was," as 
evidenced by the fact that the female residents "saw more menopausal 
complaints, PMS, marital and sexual problems-the type of problem[s] that 
often take[ ] a lot more time in terms of counseling."'35 
That the choice of female OB-GYNs is not simply due to traditional 
mores or stereotypes is underscored by the fact that many patients, such as 
Lewis, Hudgins-Brewer, Morgan-Mann, Ruth ~ e r ~ d o r f , ' ~ ~  Pat Kellogg 
~riedman,'~' Judy ~ a v e n , ' ~ ~  Rachel and Barbara ~ ~ r u i l l ' ~  
reported switching from a male OB-GYN to a female one, sometimes after 
many years of having seen a male physician. This suggests that even after 
overcoming any inhibitions about being physically examined by a male 
OB-GYN, these patients were still attracted to the idea of a female OB- 
GYN. It also suggests that the choice of a female OB-GYN is often due 
not to uninformed stereotypes, but informed experience. Both of these 
points stand in contrast to commentators' suggestions that once patients get 
131. Peradotto, supra note 13, at ID. 
132. Ladd, supra note 6, at Dl. 
133. Carnahan, supra note 8, at 8F. 
134. Id. 
135. Ladd, supra note 6, at Dl .  
136. See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 60 (stating that Ruth Bergdorf switched to a female 
OB-GYN at age thirty-seven). 
137. See Andrea Gerlin, Is the Male Gynecologist Going Extinct?, CHATTANOOGA TIMES,  
Feb. 22, 1996, at D l  (interviewing a woman who said that she switched from a male to a 
female OB-GYN because the male OB-GYN appeared to be insensitive). 
138. See Carnahan, supra note 8, at 9F (noting that Judy Kaven saw the same male OB- 
GYN for seventeen years and then switched to a female OB-GYN). 
139. See Condor, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Powers saw a male OB-GYN for four 
years and then switched to a female OB-GYN). 
140. See Ladd, supra note 6, at Dl (reporting that Spruill switched from a male to a 
female OB-GYN after moving to a new city). 
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used to healthcare from the opposite sex, or get over their traditional 
conceptions about gender roles, they will no longer prefer same-gender 
care.I4' 
Nonetheless, in a recent resurgence of articles published on the topic 
of the privacy BFOQ, commentators have continued to argue that 
preferences for same-sex healthcare derive from and reinforce gender 
stereotypes, without substantive consideration of the current trend toward 
female OB-GYNS, the expressed reasons for that trend, or whether those 
reasons contribute anything to the analysis. Amy Kapcynzki, for example, 
argues that: 
Same-sex privacy cases . . . reinforce a symbolic order of gender 
that has a discriminatory effect upon women, because, for 
example, it casts them as constitutively vulnerable to sexualized 
attack, and as essentially and necessarily modest in a way that 
resonates with tendencies to propertize women and deny them 
sexual agency.142 
Kapcynzki further attacks as illogical any argument that cross-sex 
observation of one's naked body is more intrusive than observation by a 
member of the same sex.143 She therefore argues that the same-sex privacy 
BFOQ should "rarely, if ever, be judged ~e~ i t ima te . " '~  
Similarly, Sharon McGowan argues that underlying the privacy BFOQ 
are the problematic normative assumptions that a woman's modesty 
deserves special protection and that cross-sex observation is particularly 
harmful and degrading.145 McGowan therefore supports abolition of the 
privacy BFOQ outside of the prison context, where concerns about rape of 
female prisoners may warrant it.146 Jillian B. Berman also advocates 
constriction of the privacy BFOQ in the healthcare setting, arguing that 
"sex says little about a doctor's qualifications and selecting a doctor 
because of her sex perpetuates privacy norms and invidious 
di~crimination."'~' 
These commentators' arguments largely track those made by 
commentators in the 1970s and 1980s, with relatively little attention given 
either to the changes in the landscape since that time, or to possible 
reformulations of the privacy BFOQ that might address several of their 
chief concerns. Kapcynzki, for example, questions how it can "be more or 
141. See, e.g., Sirota, supra note 16, at 1065 ("While the presence of members of the 
opposite sex may initially shock or surprise customers, repeated exposure eventually may 
result in customer acceptance of the new work roles."). 
142. Kapcynzki, supra note 17, at 1261-62. 
143. Id. at 1269-70. 
144. Id. at 1262. 
145. McGowan, supra note 17, at 100-08. 
146. Id. at 79. 
147. Bennan. supra note 17, at 773-74. 
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less private-as opposed to comfortable, intuitive, pleasing, or 
embarrassing-to be seen in a state of undress by a male nurse rather than 
by a male doctor."'48 The possibility that the privacy BFOQ could, 
however, be expanded to encompass OB-GYNs receives limited 
consideration. Berman does acknowledge the possibility, but quickly 
rejects it;I4' Kapcynzki notes the trend toward female OB-GYNs in a 
footnote, but simply posits that courts likely "would not be persuaded that 
female patients' privacy rights are grounds for BFOQs in these cases, in 
large part because women have long been attended to by male ob-gyns."'50 
Similarly, although Kapcynzki and McGowan argue that the privacy BFOQ 
reinforces notions of women's sexual vulnerability and modesty,15' they do 
not consider the extent to which this concern could be addressed through 
the application of a privacy BFOQ on a gender-neutral basis, as in Jones v. 
Hinds General ~ o s ~ i t a l . ' ~ ~  
More broadly, neither Kapcynzki, McGowan, nor Berman delve into 
the actual reasons expressed by women who have sought out female OB- 
GYNs. Instead, they apparently assume that such preferences derive from 
the irrational belief that a greater infringement of privacy results from 
cross-sex observation of one's nude body. Putting aside the question of 
whether such a belief is irrational (and whether, if it is, Title VII should be 
concerned with its eradication) this argument fails to take account of the 
myriad reasons that actual women have given for their choice of a female 
OB-GYN, and the fact that concerns about bodily modesty are often not at 
the top of the list. 
This article's exploration of the reasons underlying the trend toward 
female OB-GYNs leads to its conclusion-in direct contrast to the bulk of 
commentary on the subject-that the courts should go even further in 
establishing the privacy BFOQ defense. Instead of focusing their inquiry 
on whether bodily modesty interests are implicated, and making such a 
determination the necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a privacy 
BFOQ, the courts should instead bring to the forefront the three basic 
principles outlined above and make them the explicit criteria for the 
privacy BFOQ. That is, the privacy BFOQ should apply in all instances 
148. Kapcynzki, supra note 17, at 1270. 
149. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 17, at 772-73 ("Extending the privacy BFOQ to male 
obstetricians and gynecologists would have the perverse effect of resexualizing the 
profession . . . . Given this country's commitment to equal employment, the privacy BFOQ 
should not be extended to physicians absent a compelling justification."). 
150. Kapcynzki, supra note 17, at 1265 n.49, 1266. 
151. See id. at 1284-85 (arguing that courts rely on traditional notions of chastity that 
restrict women's sexual autonomy); McGowan, supra note 17, at 98-99 (discussing the 
court's view of the potential for trauma and anxiety for women, as compared to men, if 
subjected to cross-sex observation). 
152. 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
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where courts find that customers have: (1) a preference for same-gender 
care in (2) a business that itself implicates privacy or therapeutic interests 
that are specifically gender-related,153 and (3) the preference is not based 
on, and does not perpetuate, malignant characterizations of the genders.154 
Under the current doctrine, this is largely not occurring, since most 
courts regard the privacy BFOQ as limited to cases in which customers 
appear nude before employees. The formative privacy BFOQ cases, such 
156 
as ~ a c k ~ s l ~ ~  and Mercy, all emphasized the physically intimate nature of 
the jobs at issue, and several courts have described the privacy BFOQ as 
protecting only bodily privacy.157 When faced with customer preferences 
- 
153. Thus, the preference of a particular supervisor or customer for employees of the 
same gender would be insufficient; the business itself must be explicitly gender-related. 
154. This final concern has been emphasized by commentators who argue that in certain 
instances, differential treatment on the basis of gender should be permissible. For example, 
Chai R. Feldblum, Nancy Fredman Krent, and Virginia G. Watkin have argued that all- 
female organizations (such as schools or youth activities) should be permitted under a 
"compensatory purpose" rationale if they satisfy the following four-pronged test: 
(1) there is a sex-based disadvantage suffered by [the group's] membership 
related to its basis of classification; (2) the intention in forming or continuing 
the organization is to compensate for this disadvantage; (3) the organization's 
programs and policies are not based upon and do not perpetuate archaic and 
stereotypical notions of the abilities or roles of the sexes; and (4) it is the 
organization's single-sex policy and programs that directly and substantially 
help its members compensate for the previous disadvantages. 
Chai R. Feldblum, et a]., LRgal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.- 
C.L. L. REV. 171,219 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Ruth Colker has argued that the principle of anti-subordination should be 
brought to the forefront of equal protection jurisprudence, arguing that "race- and sex-based 
equal protection doctrine emerged from a concern for the subordination of blacks and 
women" and that "a race- or sex-specific rule could be viewed as a positive step towards 
eliminating race- or sex-based inequalities, as redressing subordination rather than creating 
differentiation." Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1058-59 (1986). Specifically, Colker proposes that a 
gender-based policy should not be presumed invalid unless it produces a negative disparate 
impact on a single sex, and that even if it does produce such an impact, the policy should 
still be held constitutional if its purpose has a "powerful impact on redressing 
subordination." Id. at 1060. 
This article's proposal echoes those advanced by these articles in its concern for the 
potentially subordinating effects of gender-based preferences. It differs from them, 
however, in an important respect, satisfaction of the three-prong standard proposed by this 
article does not hinge on-in fact, does not even consider-the existence of a history of 
subordination and the need to remedy that history. Rather, this article's point is that there 
are other reasons for gender-based preferences that should legitimately be taken into 
account and given effect, as long as doing so will not result in subordination. 
155. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). 
156. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256 
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982). 
157. See, e.g., Olsen v. Maniott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060 (D. Ariz. 1999) 
(noting that "[allthough the inquiry into whether sex constitutes a BFOQ usually focuses on 
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for same-gender healthcare that relate more to therapeutic interests than to 
physical modesty concerns, courts have typically shown little deference. In 
158 EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., for example, the court rejected a weight loss 
center's claim that female sex was a BFOQ.''~ The center, whose clientele 
was ninety-five percent female, employed exclusively female counselors, 
160 largely for therapeutic purposes. As the court explained: 
The customers who attend Physicians Weight Loss centers are 
seeking help and guidance to lose weight. Often weight loss is a 
difficult endeavor for them and they need help and guidance to 
succeed. The customers may have failed in losing weight on 
their own and may suffer from low self-esteem. Embarrassment 
about their bodies and a reluctance to let others know their 
weight and measurements may also be experienced by the 
customers. Counselors at Physicians Weight Loss may serve as 
role models and motivators for customers. Often counselors have 
had their own personal weight loss experience and have faced the 
same challenges the customers face. 
Some female customers of Physicians Weight Loss object to 
having their measurements, whether by tape or caliper, taken by a 
man and would not feel comfortable discussing emotional and 
physiological issues associated with weight loss with a man. 
These emotional and physiological issues may involve sexual 
relationships and physical issues uniquely related to women. 16' 
Despite the court's apparent acceptance of this argument, it still rejected 
the center's claim that being female was a BFOQ for the counseling 
positions. The court explicitly rejected the "proposition that Physicians 
Weight Loss customers have a privacy interest that extends to the 
counseling function"'62 and indicated that only bodily privacy interests 
were relevant to the analysis. It then stressed that the bodily privacy 
interests at stake were minimal, because the body measurements were taken 
key job skills or the employer's central mission, courts also have found an employee's sex 
to be a BFOQ in certain situations in which a customer's or client's bodily privacy interests 
might otherwise be compromised."); see also EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 
(N.D. 111. 1993) (reducing the issue of whether female sex was a BFOQ for instructor 
positions in a women's health club to the question of whether the "touching at issue" in the 
relevant positions-namely, "touching clients on their breasts, inner thighs, buttocks, and 
crotch area when taking measurements and instructing members on the use of equipment 
and proper exercise formn--implicated protectable privacy interests, or whether only cases 
involving "exposure to nudity, touching of genitals, and observance of private bodily 
functions" could rise to that level). 
158. 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Miss. 1996). 
159. Id. at 305-06. 
160. Id. at 302-03. 
161. Id. at 303. 
162. Id. at 304. 
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through clothing and could even be taken by the women themselves if they 
felt uncomfortable with having the counselor take them.'63 
Similarly, in Jatczak v. ~ c h b u r ~ , ' ~ ~  the court also essentially rejected 
the notion that therapeutic interests served by same-gender care could 
justify a BFOQ. There, a female filed suit after being denied, on the basis 
of gender, a child-care worker position at a community mental health 
program for young adults that was an outpatient facility of the Michigan 
Department of ~ e a 1 t h . I ~ ~  The position involved teaching appropriate work 
skills and behavior to mentally ill young adults, ninety-five percent of 
whom were male, to assist them in obtaining "employment in the outside 
The director of the program had obtained permission from the 
Civil Service to classify the position as "male only" because of the need for 
a male role model to demonstrate and exemplify appropriate work behavior 
to the predominantly male population, the importance of providing a male 
figure to the majority of male patients who lacked a father or other similar 
significant males in their lives, the need to have a male present to counsel 
the male patients on the topic of male sexuality, and the concern that many 
of the male patients had previously had negative experiences with females 
in positions of authority.16' The director of the program testified that "it 
was absolutely essential that the position in question be filled by a male."'68 
Nonetheless, the Jatczak court rejected the argument that male sex was a 
BFOQ for the position.'69 It stressed that the position involved "no 
responsibility for intimate body contact with the clientele," and found that 
"[alny counseling provided by the worker was purely in~idental."'~~ 
This article does not mean to suggest that courts always minimize the 
therapeutic interests implicated in same-gender care. On the contrary, two 
cases-City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations 
~ornmission'~' and Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric ~os~ital '~~-il lustrate 
how courts can appropriately take such interests into account in their 
assessment. In City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia argued that female 
gender was a BFOQ for the positions in its juvenile hall facility that 
involved supervision of females, and that male gender was a BFOQ for the 
163. Id. 
164. 540 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
165. Id. at 700. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 701. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 704-05. 
170. Id. at 704. 
171. 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). This case was decided under state law rather 
than Title VII. Because the court interpreted the state anti-discrimination law's BFOQ 
provision using federal precedent, however, this distinction is essentially irrelevant. See id. 
at 100 n.3. 
172. 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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positions involving supervision of males.'73 The court accepted this 
argument, noting not only the physical privacy interests at stake (since 
supervisors sometimes had to supervise daily showers and perform full 
body searches for ~ontraband) '~~ but also the therapeutic interests 
implicated by the position. The court explained: 
It is the role of the Supervisor to gain the confidence and the 
respect of the children in order to aid them in regaining a proper 
perspective of the trying problems of growing up in a dangerous, 
hostile, competitive world. The Commission cannot expect the 
City to produce cold, empirical facts to show that girls and boys 
at this age relate better to Supervisors of the same sex. It is 
common sense that a young girl with a sexual or emotional 
problem will usually approach someone of her own sex, possibly 
her mother, seeking comfort and answers . . . . A like situation 
prevails for the boys. To expect a female or a male supervisor to 
gain the confidence of troubled youths of the opposite sex in 
order to be able to alleviate emotional and sexual problems is to 
expect the impossible.175 
Thus, the court found that these interests justified gender-based 
BFOQs for the positions,'76 albeit over a strong dissent arguing that the 
positions in question "involve[d] dealings with the children when they are 
in various states of undress only to a minimal extent,"'77 and that there was 
no reason to think that "women cannot handle security or counseling 
problems for the boys" or vice versa.I7' 
Similarly, in the more recent Healey case, the Third Circuit explicitly 
stated that therapeutic considerations had influenced its BFOQ analysis.'79 
Southwood Psychiatric Hospital (Southwood) was treating emotionally 
disturbed and sexually abused male and female adolescents and children.lS0 
It maintained a policy of gender-based staff assignment to ensure that at 
least one female and one male were present on every shift.lgl This policy 
resulted in the reassignment of the plaintiff, a child care specialist, to a less 
desirable shift, and she brought a Title VII action against ~ o u t h w o o d . ~ ~ ~  
Southwood argued that its gender-based staffing policy was justified as a 
BFOQ, noting both the physical privacy and therapeutic interests at 
173. City of Phila., 300 A.2d at 99. 
174. Id. at 101. 
175. Id. at 103. 
176. Id. at 104. 
177. Id. at 105 (Blatt, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. at 106 (Blatt, J., dissenting). 
179. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133. 
180. Id. at 1 30. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
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stake.Is3 It asserted that role modeling was an important aspect of the 
staffers' role,IM and also claimed that a balanced staff was "necessary 
because children who have been sexually abused will disclose their 
problems more easily to a member of a certain sex."185 The court found 
that "due to both therapeutic and privacy concerns," Southwood had indeed 
established a gender-based BFOQ, ruling that both factors went to the 
essence of Southwood's business.lS6 
City of Philadelphia and Healey, however, represent exceptions to the 
general presumption that a privacy BFOQ can only be established in 
response to bodily modesty interests. It is time for the rest of the courts to 
abandon this limitation. The case law's emphasis on the "essence of the 
business" test highlights what should be viewed as the fundamental 
purpose of Title VII: to prevent prejudice and stereotypes from blocking 
equally qualified employees from work. Although Johnson Controls 
certainly reiterated that the "essence of the business" test is intended to be 
stringent, nothing in its discussion of the "essence of the business" test 
foreclosed the validity of the privacy BFOQ, as the majority specifically 
pointed Rather, the strictness of the Court's application of the test 
lay in its unwillingness to validate BFOQs that were not related to 
occupational issues-that is, those "job-related skills and aptitudes . . . that 
affect an employee's ability to do the job."188 
Focusing on the healthcare context, this article has identified several 
ways in which being of a particular gender can directly affect an 
employee's ability to do the job. First, same-gender counselors often have 
a better ability to serve as role models. This heightened ability can take on 
great importance in the gym or mental health setting, as the defendants in 
Hi 40 Corp. and Healey described with respect to females, and as the 
defendants in Jatczak described with respect to males. 
Second, patients frequently are more comfortable and willing to 
discuss intimate, gender-specific topics with physicians and counselors of 
the same gender, as illustrated by the quotations of many patients in the 
articles discussed above, and as alluded to by the City of Philadelphia 
court. This interest can be seen as implicating a type of "psychological" 
privacy that is sometimes even more significant to patients than is physical 
privacy. It is obvious that the more willing patients are to share their 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 133. 
185. Id. Southwood did not claim that females would always disclose their problems 
more easily to females or that males would necessarily be more forthcoming with males; 
rather, it claimed that the preferred sex would depend on the child's sex as well as the sex of 
the person who had abused him or her. Id. 
186. Id. at 1 34. 
187. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 206 n.4. 
1 88. Id. at 201. 
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gender-related concerns with their healthcare providers, the more complete 
and effective their healthcare will be. Unlike airline service, in which 
flight attendants' respective "soothing" abilities are largely tangential to the 
essence of the business, a patient's willingness--or lack thereof-to raise 
health-related concerns and questions with his or her healthcare provider 
goes directly to the heart of the healthcare business. If a healthcare 
provider is not fully informed about all of the health problems plaguing a 
patient, he or she cannot provide that patient with effective care. 
Third, same-gender healthcare providers have the advantage of shared 
physicality. As numerous patients and physicians described, the first-hand 
experience with gynecological examinations, menstruation, menopause, 
and pregnancy that female OB-GYNS often possess can often make them 
more effective caregivers. As Dr. Wendy Pesterfield put it, "'I've been 
there. I've had menstrual cramps. I've had labor pains. I've had morning 
sickness. I think while men can be very good oblgyns and can be 
sympathetic, I don't know that they could have the empathy and 
understanding that a female could have. ,79189 By the same token, Dr. Judith 
Ortman-Nabi noted that "'if you take the example of urologists, the 
majority are male . . . . A woman urologist would have no idea what it feels 
like to have trouble voiding because of a prostate that's big, just as a man 
can't relate to what some women are going through. ,,'I90 
This is not to say that female gender is a necessity for OB-GYNS and 
diet counselors in all-female gyms, nor that male gender is a necessity for 
urologists. Rather, this article's argument is that preferences for same- 
gender healthcare that relate to physical modesty should not be given more 
deference than preferences relating to therapeutic interests, and, moreover, 
that neither type of preference should be dismissed as simply masking 
malignant, stereotypical attitudes about appropriate gender roles. Both 
types of preferences clearly relate directly to the essence of many 
healthcare businesses, and neither relies on nor perpetuates a chauvinistic 
conception of the genders. Thus, both types of interests would satisfy the 
second prong of the proposed three-prong BFOQ test and-if the other two 
prongs were also met-would entitle an employer to take gender into 
account when making employment decisions. 
IV. THE CASE OF THE MALE OB-GYN: How WOULD, AND SHOULD, IT 
BE RESOLVED? 
Having outlined the proposal for a reformulated privacy BFOQ, this 
189. Carnahan, supra note 8, at 9F. 
190. Peradotto, supra note 13, at ID. 
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article now returns to the specific question of the male OB-GYN. A 
comparison of the ways in which the current privacy BFOQ doctrine and 
this article's revised BFOQ doctrine would analyze this issue provides 
support for this article's proposal. 
As of yet, courts have not had to rule on whether female sex can 
qualify as a BFOQ for OB-GYNs and thus justify even explicit gender 
discrimination in employment decisions. Dr. Garfinkel's case, brought in 
1998 under the New Jersey Law Against ~iscrimination'~' (whose relevant 
language tracks that of Title VII almost exactly)'92, has not been addressed 
on the merits due to the procedural questions.'93 Meanwhile, two courts in 
the Second Circuit have heard cases brought by male OB-GYNs claiming 
gender discrimination, but neither court ended up reaching the fundamental 
194 issue. In Underkofler v. Community Health Care Plan, Inc., a male OB- 
GYN claimed that he had been terminated because of his gender and 
replaced by a female.lg5 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the defendant had 
offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (poor job performance) for 
the plaintiff's terrninati~n. '~~ 
In Veleanu v. Beth Israel Medical the court came closer to 
reaching the fundamental question. There, a male OB-GYN charged that 
he had been terminated because his defendant employer (a faculty practice 
group of OB-GYNs affiliated with Beth Israel Medical Center) "sought to 
establish a staff of younger, female physicians."198 In support of his gender 
discrimination claim, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had hired a 
female employee to replace him,'99 and also pointed to the defendant's 
willingness to accommodate female patients who requested female OB- 
G Y N S . ~ ~  
The Veleanu court found that neither of these arguments raised an 
inference of gender dis~rimination.~~' First, it found that the evidence did 
not support plaintiff's argument that the new female employee had been 
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:s-1 et seq. (West 2003). 
192. See, e.g., Spragg v. Shore Care, 679 A.2d 685,693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) 
(stating that "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a BFOQ provision virtually 
identical to ours."). 
193. See Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 773 A.2d 665, 667 
(N.J. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs gender discrimination claim was not subject to 
arbitration and could proceed in a court of law). 
194. No. 99-7838,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19040, at *I (2d Cir. Aug. 4,2000). 
195. Id. at *2. 
196. Id. at *5-*7. 
197. 98 Civ. 7455 (VM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,2000). 
198. Id. at *3. 
199. Id. at *25. 
200. Id. at *22. 
201. Id. at *23-*38. 
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specifically hired to replace him.202 More interestingly, in response to the 
plaintiff's argument about the defendant's accommodation of female 
patients, the court stated that such accommodations were appropriate 
because of the personal privacy interests inherent.'03 Appealing to Backus, 
Fesel, and Jones, the court noted that OB-GYNs provide "intimate and 
sensitive personal care to a women's [sic] body," and that such care 
"implicates the patients' privacy rights, personal dignity and self- 
respect."204 The court concluded that individual accommodations of 
patients' preferences were legitimate and did not give rise to an inference 
of discrimination against the plaintiff.205 The court did not address, 
however, whether it would be permissible for a medical facility not only to 
accommodate those female patients who specifically requested female OB- 
GYNs, but also to take gender into account in employment decisions 
generally. Indeed, the court stated that it "need not address the permissible 
bounds to which this principle [the legality of accommodating female 
patients' requests] may carry."206 
How will the first court that must address these boundaries rule? In 
fact, the existing doctrine does not provide a clear indication of the answer. 
Depending on its sympathies, a court could easily find justification for 
ruling either way. On the one hand, a defendant employer could make a 
good argument that the privacy BFOQ justifies gender-based employment 
decisions regarding OB-GYNs. It could highlight the considerable bodily 
modesty interests at stake, and could also appeal to precedents like Backus 
and Mercy. If female gender is a BFOQ for labor nurses, the defendant 
would argue, why not for OB-GYNs themselves? The Veleanu court's 
language indicates that it might have been sympathetic to such an 
argument, although it is far from certain that this would have been the 
outcome. 
Indeed, a male plaintiff could make strong counter-arguments. First, 
he could point to the predominance of males in the OB-GYN field. It is 
difficult-indeed, virtually impossible-to make a credible argument that 
male OB-GYNs are incapable of doing their jobs, given that at least as of 
2001, the majority of OB-GYNs were still male.207 This phenomenon 
places the court in a more difficult position than that faced by the Backus 
and Mercy courts, since labor nurses have long been female.208 
202. Id. at *25. 
203. Id. at *22-*24. 
204. Id. at *23. 
205. Id. at *23-*25. 
206. Id. at *24-*25. 
207. Lewin, supra note 6, at A1 (noting that as of 2001, sixty-four percent of the 
physicians practicing obstetrics and gynecology were male). 
208. See, e.g., LEAVITT, supra note 30, at 171-95 (describing how until the mid- 
twentieth century, childbirth in the United States took place most often in the home, assisted 
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Additionally, a male OB-GYN could point out that courts applying the 
privacy BFOQ typically conceive of it as protecting physical privacy, and 
that the evidence indicates that this is not the primary concern of OB-GYN 
patients. As discussed above, most patients' statements indicate that their 
preferences for female OB-GYNs stem largely from interests relating to 
psychological comfort. For both of these reasons, the court addressing this 
case will not have the luxury, as the Backus and Mercy courts did, of 
resting its holding on traditional mores about women's bodily modesty. 
The inability of the existing doctrine to satisfactorily resolve this 
question indicates a fundamental weakness in its approach. Given the 
doctrine's emphasis on those privacy interests that are deeply ingrained in 
tradition, a male OB-GYN may well convince the courts that female sex 
simply cannot be a BFOQ for OB-GYNs. But such a finding would be 
ironic in no small sense. Were a court to decide that female sex is not a 
BFOQ for OB-GYNs, we would be left with the troubling result that being 
female is a BFOQ for labor nurses, but not for the physician who actually 
delivers the baby. It is that result that would truly freeze societal attitudes, 
by giving inappropriate deference to a history shaped by gender bias. On 
the other hand, for a court to decide that being female is now a BFOQ for 
OB-GYNs would undeniably seem inconsistent with the current conception 
of the privacy BFOQ as a very narrow, tightly constrained exception. 
Technically, of course, such a holding could be justified solely on grounds 
that nudity is implicated in a gynecological examination. But this rationale 
is problematic not only because there is proof that bodily modesty interests 
are not prohibitive in this context, but also because it represents a narrow, 
overly formalistic approach to a profound question about how far we want 
Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate to reach. The reformulated BFOQ 
would provide a more satisfactory approach toward resolving this question, 
by explicitly expanding the privacy BFOQ on a principled basis and 
acknowledging that it goes beyond instances where gender is an absolute or 
virtual necessity. 
Using this article's three-prong test to determine whether female sex is 
a BFOQ for OB-GYNs would yield a straightforward answer: yes. The 
first prong would clearly be satisfied. Only females see OB-GYNs; thus, 
this issue implicates a preference for same-gender healthcare, rather than a 
general view that only males or only females should be physicians. Indeed, 
although a finding that female sex is a BFOQ for OB-GYNs might further 
discourage men from specializing in this field, it would certainly not keep 
them out of the general field of medicine. The second criterion is also met, 
as significant gender-related privacy and therapeutic interests are by 
by female "helpers" and midwives; childbirth then moved to hospitals, under the direction 
of male obstetricians and amid "the bustle of [nurses wearing] starched skirts"). 
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definition implicated in the OB-GYN field, as described above. The third 
prong would be satisfied as well, because this preference does not derive 
from malignant gender stereotypes about men. There is no evidence that 
any of the female patients seeking a female OB-GYN refuse to see male 
physicians for other medical matters, or that they believe men are less 
intelligent or competent physicians. On the contrary, the evidence 
indicates that women are specifically seeking out female physicians for the 
particular aspect of medical care that is the most intimate and gender- 
specific. Moreover, as discussed above, the fact that so many women used 
a male OB-GYN for years before switching to a female OB-GYN 
underscores that this preference is not based on malignant or ignorant 
biases. 
This proposal's straightforward resolution of the question should not 
be seen as reflecting callousness toward the plight of male OB-GYNS. 
There is no question that the broadened BFOQ defense proposed by this 
article would impose harms on the non-preferred sex in various healthcare 
employment settings, and this is a definite cost. That said, the statutory 
recognition of the BFOQ defense to gender discrimination, the legislative 
history's explicit indication that concern about respecting patients' 
preferences for same-gender healthcare helped to bring about that defense, 
and the recent data regarding patients' (emphatically non-chauvinistic) 
reasons for preferring same-gender healthcare all militate in favor of a 
robust application of the defense in the healthcare context. Accordingly, 
this article disagrees with the sentiments of one frustrated male OB-GYN 
who stated that, "'I've learned that they're not looking for me if the ad says 
they need an ob-gyn in an all-female practice. . . . I don't see how it's 
different from an ad saying 'physician wanted to join all-Caucasian 
r,,209 practice . This article contends that there is a real difference-and that 
the doctrine should be developed accordingly. 
209. Lewin, supra note 6, at A14. 
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